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IN RE PETERSEN 
[51 C.2d 177; 331 P.2d 241 
In Bank. Oct. 
MAG~US J. 
177 
[1] Habeas Corpus--Grounds-Unconstitutional Statute or Ordi-
nance.-Uahcns em·pus available to test the 
of whieh a is held. 
!d.-Necessity for Actual Imprisonment.--The of 
of habeas corpus does not on aetna] detention in 
[3] Bail-Purpose-Effect of Admitting to BaiL-A ad-
mitted to bail is constructively in custody nnd suhjeet to re-
straint the purpose of bail, whether before or 
after is practical assurance that he will attend on 
the court when his presence is required. 
[4] to Admit to Bail.---The Supreme Court may ad-
to hail pending determination of habeas 
corpus proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 1'176.) 
[5] Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction.-Thc Supn'mc Court docs not 
lack to issue the writ of habeas corpus merely 
becnuse another court has relPased petitioner on hail after the 
of his 
[6] Id.-R.estraint-Voluntary Custody.-Haheas corpus is an ap-
propriate remedy to test the constitutionality of an ordinanf'P, 
]Wtitioner was admitted to bail hy the municipal court 
while the Court was considering his pl'tition nnd 
hefor(' it the writ. (Disapproving· In re Ford, 160 Cal. 
~1:3-t, 342 [116 P. 757]; E.c [Jarte Schmitz, 150 Cal. 663 [89 P. 
; In re Gilkey, 85 Cal. A pp. -184 [259 P. and In rc 
Ortiz, 71 Cnl.App. 163 [234 P. SIT], insofar ns are in~ 
consistent with this conelnsion.) 
[7] Municipal Corporations- Ordinances- Validity- Presump-
tions--Onlinmwcs arP presunH'd to be valid, and no provision 
of the c-hallenged ordinanee may he condemned as an impropPr 
('xerciBe of the police power if any rational ground exists for 
its enadment. 
Halwns r·orpus to test of ordinance undn 
which petitioner is lwld, note, 32 A.L.R. 10:)4. Sc(; also Cal. 
Jur.2d, Halwns ~ 20: Am .• Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 28. 
P.IJ St•e Cal.Jur.2cl, Bail and § 3; Am.Jur., Bnil 
and ~ ll et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] IIahens 
Corpus, ~::i; BaiL s~1, 14; [+]Bail, §7; 
§4G; [GJ lblwas (ol'pus, ~6; [7jll11micipal 
[8, 11-1:), Streets,§ G9; Higllwn:,·s, § 111; Fnmehises, 
§ 18; HJ] C()nstitutional Law, § 85; [17, 18] Lieenses, § 8. 
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Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-There mny be rational 
for the establishment of exclusive taxicab stamls since 
an obstruetion of traffic result if many enhs of different 
should try to park at one stand, the sole 
who has a eounection with its exclusive Htnnd would 
he in better position to maintain a constant cab service at 
the without an excessive of cabs at some times 
and a dearth at and stands may facilitate 
a11d may prevent disorderly and 
solicitation of one customer by drivers of different taxicab 
[9] Highways-Use.--The use of highways by a common carrier is 
a which may be granted or withheld by tho state in 
its discretion wHhout violating eithN the due process or equal 
clause. 
[10] Franchises-:Exclusiveness of Grant.-Generally, the govern-
ment has po''··er to grant exclusive rights to engage in srrvices 
of public character as contrasted with an ordinary business 
or profession. 
[11] Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.--The power to estab-
lish exdusive taxicab stunds may be upheld as a regulation 
condueive to the general welfare comparable to the granting 
of an exelusive franchise. 
[12] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-Since a municipality may 
deny the use of its streets to all but one common carrier, it 
may validly direct that each of several taxicab owners use 
separate stands. 
[13] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-The requirement that con-
sent of the occupant of adjacent renl property he first ob-
tained before stands on public streets may he useil by tnxicn bs 
does not render unconstitutional an ordinance providing for 
stauds re~trieted to the exdm<ivz: n:-oe hy one pe"JniltPe; it is 
proper where the proposed activity is otherwise prohibited 
and the prohibition is a reasonable exercise of the police power. 
[14] I d.- Regulation- Taxicab Stands.-Tlw rerJuiremcnt of a 
police code section that consl'nt of the occupant 
of adjacent real property be flrst obtained lwfore stands on 
public streets may be used is not necessarily um·ensonable he-
cause of the asserted lack of legitimate interest such oc-
cupant; if the consent system has undesirable such as 
the power of the occup:mt to exact pnyment for his con:;ent, 
the of the advantages and disadvantages is a matter 
of wholly within the legislative power of the munici-
pality. 
[15] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-Tlw reqnireme11t a 
nnmidpal police code seetion that consent of the oteupant of 
used by taxicnbs does not delegate to 
to designate taxicab 
eondition prPeedent to the 
eesides in the ehief of poliee. 
[16] Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-To Ad-
ministrative Officers.-Generally, a cannot eon-
unlimited on an admini~trative officer without 
his but there are limitations 
[17] Licenses-Power to License-Subdelegation of Authority.--
The of discretionary power to an administrative of-
not restricted by specific standards, to eonfer or grant 
lic·cnsc,; or permits is upheld in a variety of situation,; where 
the licensed aetivity, because of its dangerous or 
might be regulated or restrictf;d to certain localities. 
[18] Id.- Power to License- Subdelegation of Authority.-The 
absence of express standards in those situations when; c1i~cre­
tionary power is granted to an administrative offlcer to conf:e:r 
licenses or permits docs not mean thnt the ngPncy 
may act arbitrarily or oppressively; it is that the 
agency will perform its public duty, but an abuse mny he 
shown and relief obtained in the courts. 
[19] Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-To Ad-
ministrative Officers.-Standards for administrative action can 
sometimes be found by implication. 
[20] Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-'rhe purpose of con-
trolling taxicab stands by issuance of permits by tlw chief 
of police, as required by a municipal police eode 1s 
to make satisfaetory and orderly taxieab service 
able to the public without unnecessary obstruction of traillc; 
the purpose supplies standards which the chief of police must 
observe in granting or denying the permits, and additional 
standards would not promote the objectives of the ordinance. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ denied. 
' Lewis, Field, DeGoff & Stein and Marvin E. I1ewis for Pe-
titioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarcnee A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith, Deputy Attorney 
General, Tbomas C. lJyllelJ, District Attorney Fran-
' Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Franeiseo), and 
George E. Eaglin, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent. 
o!Jiaim·d; }ll'!Tllit ,bHll 
mittee awl the number of vel1icles :nn to lhc 1 i1e slam! 
t auy orw and it shaH be unhm-!'ul for !he owrwr or 
orwratol' of any public passen:cse1· vehi<·h' for other than 
thc to oeeupy the s~ an<1. 1 Sed ion 1 L)G 
in pal't, that a rll'iYer oi' a taxicab shall not 
JJ]('llt pa~svngers on any public· ;;treci or 
'8eetion 111 \l of the Police' Code of th(' City and County of San 
"';..:;t:nH1s for Taxkab~~. 1~~tc·.-- Ht,gnlations. (:ti 8Umd 
Cflit•f of Po1iet·. In :tddltion io UJe ~~1nnd,-.: for in 
a11d Jl J S :llHl eonsi~'ltc~nt \vitl1 the Se(•tion J l18 o:f tills 
Ullapter. tlv· ChJef of Polit•e n1ay dt.•,..:;ign:::.tc in 1n·tting, st~uulr, on pulJlie 
;..;tn.·c·H: to }_!t: by taxin1!1::.'1, Aednns, limousillt'd- und 
,said \·dlil~le or \'t'1lieles l1t1S 1JCV11 
as in this Cl:ttJlter .. vr otlH•t sections 
nf t1H: ~:ul Jl:i't";F('is(·o Code pro\-ldcd. 
1,\nJKeut. of Tenant Rl'(Jllired. Dcfon• di'sl~;;n:liion of stnnd8 
]::; the ( 'l1ic:f of i>oliec :1s IJ1'0Y1dr.~tl in scct;on, \Yri-::-tl~ll 
the tennut or 1ess~~e of th;? ground i1oor or jJOrtio11 of the 
floor Jrouting the· spaee v:ht>r"~ Sl1(·ll RbuHl Js to 1H.: loe._1~-ed nnlst 
lJC' o:>t::ined. ]u til(~ f'Yt'Ilt tl!e gronnd door c,r tlJe portiou of the 
;~'J'Olllld J]()Ol' rront(ng til(' Sp<!Ct' \Yflt'l't' ,stnnd i~ :o l)(' loc;ltPd j,..:; not 
(H'tU I :1 tP11~t!Jt or !e..;~('(', J·1;1'1l the "\Yl'ii-! en enn:~<'Ilt of r1H' (HVner 
of /ron!Jug the \Yh(·re s1:~1nd i...; to !Jc !r.u1ted 
tLe 11:w;e aud ti 1 ldn).'"':A of t!Je per-
1nittee :n;d the nHnd~t:r ot' 
authorizPi1 tllerellH(lPr. \·o 
u nd (·]l;tr;~ct~'r of ~~t~::.·vlcc 
to thls 
on 
in <!l't-(Jnl:uu.:o witli tlu~ 
\-dJi(·Je shalt ot·eupy sueh stand un1e:~s it is Jice110{-'d to (1o 
nnl:nvful for ti1e o'.vucr or openttor of any public· \'d>ic-le for 
t''l under sueh lllreJ otiH'f tlwu 1 Jlt'l'Iuittt•(', to u;-;:e t.11c stnnd 
p;: I'll} it. 
~laellinr·~ lJy ClJ.ivf of Polic·e. Tl10 Chief 
t:.l1c of LL'-::.te<tl)'', Sl·cl:uL-.;, limou.sinc8 or 
i)u'wg slJ(llJ be Hllo\vcd to stand <Jt fitly one tbno 
tl1e pi:H·e~:; design;-!tt>d or au11Jorl?ct1. 
P,tnnd Perntit~. .:\JlY ~,tand }h'JTPit ~le J'C'-
thc l'J,icf of Police, without notit~ to any person execpt the 
the pc•nnit, and it shall be unlawfnl for auy person, firm 
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or established in accordance with the pro~ 
"""t"''"' 1115 1160 of the Police Code.2 
arrested when he a taxicab owned 
Cab which had been 
at the time 
he was held for trial 
vxvHkULu"' sections 1119 and 1156. While we 
habeas .::orpus is a proper 
wn:euucr sections 1119 and 1156 are constitutional. 
that l1abeas corpus is available 
,.,,.au.vu under which a 
47 CaL2d 25, 28 [300 P.2d 
825]; re 19 CaL2d 495 P.2d 22] .) 
ents contend that the writ does not lie because petitioner has 
been admitted to bail by the court. [2] The avail-
of the does not on actual deten-
tion in Where a person has been released on parole, 
tbis court has issued habeas corpus, out that he was 
subject to restraint by the penal 
29 Cal.2d 403, 408 [176 P.2d 
Cal.2d 794, 797 P .2d 873].) 
(3] also in and 
purpose of bail, whether 
is assurance that he will 
court 1vhen his presence is (See 
46 Cal.2d 810, 813 [299 217] .) 
this court may admit a to bail 
determination of habeas corpus (Pen. 
1476), and it would be unreasonable to hold that we 
to issue the writ because another 
released him on bail after the filing of his petition. 
or 
or eorpora-
um.vu"'.u'" or sedan, after such 
given.'' 
and County of San Fran-
sedan, while 
Of the .J.Vi.lUWW!< 
than or upon a stand 
provisions of Sections 
182 IN RE PETERSEN C.2d 
conclude that, under the circumstaneec; present 
corpus is bail has 
hPen allowed. 'l'he eases of MaUer 342 
r. , Ann.Cas. 1912D 1267, 
150 Cal. 663 [89 P. 
and In 
1119 and 1156 ol' the Police 
three 
of a stand for the exelnsivL' use of one per~ 
mittee constitutes an unreasonable exercise ol' the 
and violates the protection clause, (2) the 
of consent of the occupant of the real prop-
erty is an delegation to a private person of power 
to decide who may have a taxicab stand on the public 
and ) the provision which grants the chief of police dis-
eretion to exclusive stands fails to any 
standards to guide him in t11at respeet. 
Section 589.6 of the Vehiele Code speeiflea 1ly empowers 
local autlwrities to regulate taxicab stands on tl1e streets. 
[7] Ordinances are presumed to be valid, and no provision 
of the (•ha11enged ordinance may be condemned as an improper 
rxrreisc of the police power if any rational gronnd exists for 
its enaetmrnt. (Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal.2d 343, 
848 P.2d ; Parker v. Collnmr, Hl6 Cal. 1G9, 178 [236 
P. 921].) [8] In this connection it is apparent that taxi(,ab 
stallds for the exclusive use of one permittee may, from the 
point of Yiew of the public interest, have advantages over 
stands open to alL I£ many cabs of different owners should 
try to park at one stand, an obstruetion of i.raffie might result. 
The sole who has a telephone eonnection ·with its 
exclusive stand would be in a better position to maintain a 
roustant cab serviee at the strmd, without an 0xcessive supply 
of cabs at some times and a dearth at others. Exelusivc stands 
may facilitate police supervision and may prewut disorderly 
and solicitation of one customer by drivers of differ-
ent taxicab owners. Aceording-ly, we cannot agree that there 
are 110 rational for the esi ahlishme11t of exclusive 
we agree that the granting- of such stands to one 
is invalidly discrimi~Hlior;.-. [9] The use of 
a common carrier is a privilege whieh may be granted 
or withlwld the state in it:;; discretion, without violating 
-
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the due process elause or the clause. 
267 U.S. 307 [ 45 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed. 
38 A.L.R. ; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 627, 
P. 486] .) This rule was relied upon in the case 
of In re 93 CaLApp. 88, 93 [269 P. 
the court declared that a city council has the 
abolish taxicab stands from its streets. [10] It has also 
in the has to 
exclusive rights to engage in services of a 
as contrasted with an ordinary business or pnne:s;:snHl 
}fatter 163 CaL 668, 674-675 
Ann.Cas. 1914A 152} on another in Russell v. 
~c'ietJast,wn. 233 U.S. 195 (34 S.Ct. 517, 58 L.Ed. ] ; 1 
Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927), p. 580; 
12 .Am.Jur. 227-228; 23 Am.Jur. 727; 22 Cal.Jur.2d 659.) 
[11] The power to establish exclusive stands contained in an 
earlier form of the ordinance here under consideration was 
upheld as a regulation conducive to the welfare 
to the granting of an exclusive franchise. (People 
v. Galena, 24 Cal..App.2d Supp. 770, 785 [70 P.2d 724] .) 
[12] It seems obvious that, since a municipality may deny 
the use of its streets to all but one common carrier, it may 
validly direct that each of several taxicab owners use separate 
stands. 
[13] The requirement of consent of the occupant of the 
adjacent real property does not render the ordinance uncon-
stitutional. Such a requirement is proper where the proposed 
is otherwise prohibited and the prohibition is a reason-
able exercise of the police power. (Cusack Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 [37 S.Ct. 190, 61 L.Ed. 472] 
billboards in residential street] ; cf. Crowley v. Christensen, 
137 U.S. 86 [11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620], affirming Ex 
Christensen, 85 Cal. 208 [24 P. 747] [retail liquor .) 
It is pointed out in the Cusack case that a Chicago ordinance 
.,"'''llL'""'u~ the construction of billboards with the consent of 
interested property owners could not injure the complaining 
party because without such a the billboards would 
have been absolutely prohibited. In San Francisco the only 
..,.,.,mn«u>n of the Police Code for the designation of taxicab 
stands, aside from section 1119, is section 1117 which provides 
for "public" stands at specified places not involved in the 
present case, such as wharves and railroad depots. Section 
1156 prohibits drivers from awaiting employment by passen-
the 
he o<:enpant" of property. 
It cannot be said that the t'OllSClll 
l't•asorwhle breaus(' of the assPrted laek of 
on the part of tl1c oeeupant of the 
pr('scnce of a taxicab stand in front of proprrty may 
and eonsidf'J'ed lw desired some hotel owners) 
tionablP by otlwrs home . and those who wish 
to haYe a taxil'ab stand in frollt of their are interested 
relations ·with 1ll serYiee at the stand and in 
tlw permitters. Under these circumstaners it c:an reasonably 
he con"idercd in the interrst of harmouions rrlatimm and g-ood 
scr-dee to give effeet to the preferences of the oer:npants of the 
in designating stands and their N's. If the 
consent also has nndr:sirable features. sueh as the 
power of the oeeupant to exact payme11t for his eon~ent, the 
pality. 
of the advantages and is a matter 
wholly within the legislative power of' tlw munici-
[15] By requiring the eonsent of pel'som; the 
Poliee Co(le does not to them the power to 
taxic·ah stands. rrhe ultimate power remains in the ehic'f of 
poliee, and thP re(jnircment of eons0nt is only made a condition 
to the de~ignation. 
[16] \Vith respeet to the of standal'c1s for admin-
istrative aetion the generd rnle is that a lrgislativr body 
!'annot eonfer unlimited power upon an oflkrr without desig-
naiing stanclat'il.s to guide his aetion. Maid Milk 
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 641-642 P.2d 577] .) 
However, there are limitations 011 the general rnle which arc 
applic-able to the ease before us. 
[17] 'l'he granting of di;;;erctionary power, not restrided 
hy standards, to confer or deny lieenses or permits 
has been upheld in a variety of situations where the licensed 
aetivity, bceause of its dan::;erous or objectionable character, 
might be regulated or re~tricted to certain loeal itiefi. (Parker 
v. Colburn, 106 Cal. 169. 177-178 [236 P. !l2Jl [permit for 
puhlie ; In n: Ilolmcs, 187 Cnl. 640, 646-647 [203 
P. 398] [permit for dealer in sceond-hand merc~handise] ; Ex 
Oct. IN RE PETERSEN 
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213 [24 P. 747] as a 
72 CaL 125, 127-128 [13 
wooden within tht~ 
San Gabriel, 
[permit to drill for 
[262 
of see 
1 Cal.2d 87, 96 
rule was applied in 
93 Cal.App. 91, in sus-
taining a power, IJOt auy standards, 
to grant and refuse to occupy taxicabs stands. Simi-
larly, an earlier form of the ordinance attacked here was 
upheld in v. Galena, supra, 24 Cal.App.2d Supp. 770, 
779 et seq. 
[18] The absence oE express standards in :mch situations 
does not mean that the licensing agenc~y may act arbitrarily or 
; it is presumed that the agency will duly per-
but an abuse may he shown and relief 
obtained- m the courts. (In re Holmes, supra, 187 Cal. 640, 
647; v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 440 [166 
P. v. c,:ty of Burlingame, 100 Cal.App.2d 321, 
326 [223 P.2d 517]; Bleucl v. City Oakland, supra, 87 Cal. 
App. 594, 600.) 3 No or exercise of dis-
cretion the chief of detriment of petitioner, 
has been shown in this case. 
J\Ion•over, standards for administrative aetion ean 
sometimes be found by implication. In Rescue Army v. Jlfu-
28 Cal.2d 460, 471 [171 P.2d 8], where an ordi-
nance requiring a permit was involved, we held that sufficient 
standards were inherent in the reasons which must have led 
to the adoption of the ordinance. [20] 1n the present case 
it is elear that the purpose of controlling taxicab stands by 
of subdivision (d) of section 1119 which gives the 
police power to revoke stand permits ''at his pleasure'' is not 
involved in this case. It has been held that such a provision 
means the licensing agency may act only in the exercise of a wise 
uiserdion, not that it act capriciously. (Jf arrone v. City Manager 
WorcesteT N.E.2d 553, 554; People ex rel. Curtis v. 
777 [173 N.Y.S. 417]; Jfac!Jonaid v. De Waclc, 
N.W. 605, 606].) 
186 C.2d 
is to make taxi-
cab service available to the public without nnneecs;;:ary 
obstruct ion of trafTic. This purpose standards wbieh 
the chief of must observe in granting or denying the 
It is diffieult to see how, as a practical any 
additional c;tandards eonld be set forth whieh would promote 
i he of the and wonld be aeeom-
must be made express. 
Tlw writ is 
Sehauer, J., and :M:rComh, 
concurred. 
CoJWnrring and Dissenting.--] agree with 
the majority that habeas corpus is the proper remedy in 
the situation here prrseni:ed and that habeas corpus will 
lie despite the fact that petitioner has been admitted to bail. 
I disagree with the conelusion of the majorit.v that sections 
1119 and 1166 of ihe Police Codr of the City and County of 
San Franeisco arc eonstitutional. 
\Vith respr(,t to petitioner's eontention that the ordinance 
lJerc involvrd is uneoHstitutional, it should be noted initially 
that Nrw J'viontgomCJ'Y Street, on svhieh the Sheraton-Palac·e 
Hotel is a :-;treet dedirated to the publie use. \Ve hPld in 
Escobedo v. State, 33 Cal.2d 870,875 [222 P.2d J], that" 'The 
streets of a belong to the peoplP of the state, and the 
nse thrreof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to 
legislative eontrol or such reasonable regulations as to the 
traffie tlwreon or the manner of using them as the legislature 
may deem ~wi::;c or proper to adopt and impose.' (19 Cal. 
,Jur. 64, § 407.) 'Streets and highways are established and 
maintaim'd primarily for purposes of travel and transporta-
tion by the publir, and nses incidental thereto. Such travel 
may be for either business or pleasure .... 'fhe use of highways 
for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privi-
legP, hut a common and fundamental right, of which the public 
and individuals eannot rightfully be deprived .... [A lll 
yH:rsons have an equal right to usr them for purpo~es of travel 
by JH'OJH'!' means. and wiih due regard for the eorre:;;ponding 
rights of others.' (2:) Am .• Tur. 466-4:)7, § 16~); see also 40 
c .. J.s. 21J4-2t7, § 28:3.)" 
Petitioner contends that it is a de11ial of equal protection 
of the laws for the eity to grant to one taxicab company the 
street. 1 n my 
ion the <·ontcntiou is meritorious. 
The business of operating taxicabs on the streets of a mu-
is a munieipal affair, to regulation by the 
under its police power although such regulations 
conflict with the laws of tlw 
G2 Cal.App.2d 306, 315 P.2d 
Such regulation ordinance 
is expressly authorized section 
article XI, of the Constitution of this state (Grier v. Fer-
supra, 62 Ca1.App.2d 30G, 315). The section of the 
Constitution that authorizes cities to make and enforce "local, 
police, sanitary, and other regulations" does not, of course, 
confer on eities the power to pass unreasonable ordinances or 
ordinances in violation of the due proeess and equal protection 
elauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Enactment of 
arbitrary and discriminatory regulations may not be sustained 
under the guise oE police power (.Justesen's l?ood Stores, Inc. 
v. City of 12 Cal.2d :324, 329 [84 P.2d 140] ; La 
F'mnchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal.2d 331, 336 [65 P.2d 
1301, 110 A.hR. 639]). 
"The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 
makes but one demand upon the state, and gives to the state 
but one right. It is that the state shall make, execute, and 
interpret its laws without discrimination. It must not grant 
rights to one which, under similar circumstances, it denies to 
another." (Title Onamntee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. 
App. 152, 155 [183 P. 470].) A statute, or ordinance (In re 
Blois, 179 Cal. 291 [17G P. 449]) meets the constitutional 
requirements of equal protection if it relates to and operates 
uniformly on the whole of a single class properly selected. 
(Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [300 P.2d 187] ; 
.J crsey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 639, 
640 [91 P.2d 577]; Ray v. Parker, 15 Ca1.2d 275, 283 l101 
P.2d 665].) A law which subjects to equal burdens persons 
similarly situated with respect to that law is an equal law 
(Watson v. Division of JJ[otor V chicles, 212 Cal. 279, 284 
[298 P. 481]; Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 
[300 P.2d 187]). In the Watson case, this court said: "So 
long as the statute does not permit one to exercise the privi-
lege while refusing it to another of like qualifieations, under 
like conditions and circumstanees, it is unobjectionable upon" 
the ground of inequality. And it was held in Sawyer v. 
Barbour, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838, that a law was 
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Stations Assn. v Brock, 
Pasadena v. Stimson. 91 CaL P. .) 
239 U.S. 33 , 60 LEd. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 r6 S.Ct. 1 30 
LEd. Wing v. United 163 U.S. 228 
S.Ct. 977, 41 hEd. ; United States Kirn Ark, 
169 U.S. 649 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890] ; Takahashi v. Fish 
& Game 334 U.S. 410. 420 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 
1478] ; Hurd v. Hodge, :334 U.S. 24 [68 S.Ct. 847, 92 hEd. 
1187] .) In the Takahashi case, tile Supreme Court of the 
United States said that '' 'l'he Fourteenth Amendment and the 
laws adopted under its authority thus embody a genrral policy 
that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any 
state' on an equality of with 111l eitizrns under 
nondiscriminatory laws.'' 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the eity of San 
Francisco every major hotel and rvery major shop and depart-
ment store has a parking stand exclusively devoted to Yellow 
Cabs. Although other cabs are permitted to discharge passen-
gers at those points when the passengers have signified and 
made known their destination, it is also a matter of common 
lmo>Yledge that customers desiring a taxicab are not permitted 
to take an taxicab if Yello·vv cabs are waiting 
there mweeupicd. This is partieularly obnoxious to 
one's senS(' of fair play. It is of (~Ourse quite obvious that 
the taxicab company has the financial re-
sources and is able to pay more for the "consent" of the 
abnttillg owuer. In the :, it is stated that 
''The presence of a taxicab stand in froiJt of private property 
may be desired some hotel owners) and considered 
obj0etionable by others home owners) .... " This, of 
course, is quite true and quite obvious. t~uite as true and as 
obvious is the fact that any owner of any hotel or department 
store desires to obtain as great a finaneial remuneration for 
his '' eonsent'' as the tariff will bear! 'fhe holding of the 
majority puts a premium on financial worth and is designed 
to freeze out the smaller independent companies. It is my 
opinion that as long as San Francisco is an "open" city so 
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are concerned as distinguished from 
where only one taxieab eompany 
extended for the use of the streets 
to be accomplished 
to preserve or the publie 
or morals and where the orilinanee is 
unreasonable in its application to the complaining party, it 
will be held to be in violation of constitutional restrictions 
Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 230 [118 P. 714]; Ma-
203 Cal. 665, 672 [265 P. 806]). 
Bearing iu mind the above-mentioned rules, au examination 
of the ordinance in question shows that, upon application, 
permits are issued to taxicab companic>s which grant to each 
company the exclusive right to use a certain portion of the 
public streets. All duly lieenscd taxicab companies fall within 
the same class and must, according to the constitutional 
mandate>, be aceorded rqual protection. No one company may 
be given "particnlar privileges" while another is diserimi-
nated in the 1ray of location of stands for its cabs. 
This was considered in City & Co11nty of Den-
ver v. J:l5 Colo. 132 P.2d 1016, 1020], 
where the Court of Colorado said: "Although under 
our laws a may properly designate areas in which street 
or utilities may operate, it cannot grant an 
exclusive license to onr part oJ' the city's strerts to one taxicab 
company and deny the same to othrrs lawfully operating 
within its eorporate limits. Each class of licem;es or permits 
for partieular uses of highways, to be valid, must be general 
and in their operations." In the ease at bar, Yellow 
Cab would have the same right to object, on eon-
to the exc-lusive use of the portions of the 
public streets alloeated to other eab companies. The public 
streets are thr usc the as a and while the 
control of traffic nwy make it !H'eessary for the city, 
in the of its power, to set aside certain desig-
nated areas; of the :-;1 l'<'Pts foe taxi sta!](ls, tbose stands should 
be open to the use of all those "who ;;;tand in the 
same relatiou to the of the law.'' 
142 Cal.App.2d 827. 838 [800 P.2d 187].) The flrdi-
nance here i11volved in effect, for exclusive parking 
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certain segments of a class as against other 
members of that class. Such a regulation has no reasonable 
tendency to preserve, or protect, the public health, safety or 
welfare and must fail because it doE's not operate uniformly 
on the whole of a single class properly selected (Sawyer v. 
142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [300 P.2d 187]). 
in the majority opinion appear to be 
with the argument that the use of "exclu-
from "open" will the orderly 
administration of traffic, service to the public, and ''good 
relations with the permittees" be maintaim'd. Another argu-
ment subscribed to by the majority is that only a taxicab 
company sufficiently affluent to maintain a telephone connec-
tion can furnish ''constant cab service at the stand, without 
an excessive supply of cabs at some times and a dearth at 
others.'' All of these arguments are so easily met and the 
answers are so obvious that it seems unnecessary to engage 
in any extended discussion of them here. It seems obvious 
that the stands could be so regulated that only a certain 
number of cabs could stand there at any one time; that the cab 
first in line would take the first customer and the others there-
after moved up in line allowing another cab to take its place 
at the end of the line. It should be noted that as a matter 
of fact this is precisely the way the Yellow Cab Company 
operates its "exclusive" stands. It is also a matter of common 
knowledge that all taxicabs arc now radio-controlled, or oper-
ated, so that the driver may be called to pick up passengers 
at any given point. It is ridiculous to say, as docs the major-
ity opinion, that ''Exclusive stands may faeilitate police 
supervision and may prevent disorderly and aggressive solici-
tation of one customer by drivers of different taxicab owners.'' 
Inasmuch as each individual taxicab, whether owned by one 
company or another, charges the legal fare and since all are 
equipped with meters. there could be no more aggressive solici-
tation of customers if differently owned cabs were allowed to 
use the one stand than if all the cabs using it were owned by 
one company under the outlined above. As a matter 
of fact, it appears to me that taxicab service would be facili-
tated, rather than hindered, if all stands were "open" ones. 
I am sure that every taxicab user has had the experience of 
waiting patiently for a Yellow taxieab at one of the major 
hotels after a large event of some type had eoneluded. If 
eabs of other companies were permitted to use the present 
exclusive stands, service would be bettered. 
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that 
of 0xclnsive cab stands is a proper exercise of 
pow0r in that it aids in the identifieation of drivers 
aids in the maintenance of discipline at the 
stands, and aids in the maintenance of continuous service at 
the stands. It is also argued that police problems are mini-
cruising by cabs is lessened thus aid in the 
traffic problem; that the abutting landowner is "assured of 
peace of mind in being free of boisterous and ionable be-
havior by drivers and litter"; that the abutting land owner is 
assured of good cab service for his patrons. These arguments 
fail to convince. They assume that only by segregation of 
the various cab companies can the public peace, welfare and 
convenience be served. There can surely be no assumption 
that only the drivers for one company will not cause litter 
on the public streets, or not be guilty of boisterous conduct, 
or fail to provide service to the public, or be guilty of over-
charge, or other unlawful conduct. All taxicabs are required 
to be distinctively marked, and pres1lmably all drivers for all 
companies possess the required qttalifications and have been 
duly licensed as required by law. It is difficult to see how 
open taxi stands would have any deleterious effeet insofar as 
police problems are concerned. The companies retain control 
of their drivers, the number of cabs at any one stand at one 
time is a matter readily eapable of regulation, and it would 
appear that open cab stands would have no effect whatsoever 
insofar as the cruising problem is concerned. As a matter of 
fact the so-called ''cruising taxicab'' is tl1e prospective cus-
tomer's only hope during rush hours when all the exclusive 
Yellow Cab stands are completely unoccupied. Again, the 
traffic problem, service to the public, and the orderly use of 
the public streets, would be facilitated, rather than hindered, 
if unoccupied taxicabs of other companies were permitted to 
stand in the vacant stands set aside for the exclusive use of 
the Yellow Cab Company. 
As has bern heretofore set forth all taxicabs fall within 
one dass and any legislation affecting that class must operate 
equally upon members of the class. 
Amicus euriae also contends that the use of the public 
streets for private gain is a matter of privilege and not of 
right and that such privilege may be prohibited or regulated in 
the public interest. The contention is, of course, meritorious. 
But when the privilege is granted, it must be granted on 
equal terms to all within the class to which it is granted. In 
that all peTsons 
situated will be treated al£kc. (Old Dearborn 
299 F.S. 18~l [il7 S.Ct . 




It is no answer to the constitutional to the ordi-
nance that the owner must consent to the 's 
use of the street for a taxicab stand. An landowner 
retains only the of ingress and egress to his property. 
In Bacich v. Board Control., 23 Cal.2d 350 [144 
P.2d 818], we held that the "owner of property abutting 
upon a public street has a property right in the nature of an 
easement in the street which is appurtenant to his abutting 
property and which is his private right, as distinguished from 
his right as a member of the public. That right has been 
described as an easement of ingress aud egress to and from his 
property .... " Amicus curiae argues that the 
owner has the right to "waive" his ingress and egress rights 
as to certain taxicabs and that waiving it as to one company 
is not a waiver as to all companies. This contention was 
answered adversely in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 
279, 303 [26 S.Ct. 9], 50 LEd. 1921, where the court said: 
''But the right of the railroad company, as abutting owner 
and the rights of passengers are not, in thrir nature, para-
mount to the rights of others of the general publie to use 
the sidewalk in question in legitimate ways and for legitimate 
purposes. Licensed hackmen and cabmen, unless forbidden 
by valid local regulations, may, within reasonable limits, use 
a public sidmvalk in prosecuting their calling, provided such 
use is not materially obstrurtive in its nature, that of such 
exclusive character as, in a substantial sensE', to prevent 
others from also using it upon <'qual terms for legitimate pur-
poses. Generally speaking, public sidewalks and streets are 
for use by all, upon equal terms, for any purpose consistent 
with the object for which such sidewalks and streets are estab-
lished; subject of course to such valid regulations as may he 
prescribed by the constituted authorities for the public con-
venienee; this, to the end that, as far as possible, the rights 
of all may be conserved without undue discrimination." 
It is conceded that the municipality has the paramount 
] 
chooses 
of the public 
welfare and property 
oww~r has is that such stands do not interfere with that right 
of and egress. It is not within the power an 
upon those who are ent itlecl 
terms w£th others ·''·nwu..rrn 
situated. v. 48 Ca1.2d 189, 195 
[309 P.2d 10], that "An abutter's casement of access arises 
as a matter of law v. 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 
505]). It is a property right enjoyed the abutter as an 
incident of his of property, and is separate and 
distinct from the right of the general public in and to the 
street. 'While certain general rules have been set forth in the 
various decisions which have considered the nature and scope 
of this right, each ease must be considered upon its own facts. 
The right of access has been defined as extending to a nsc 
of the road for purposes of ingress and egress to his property 
by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriat0 
to the highway and in such manner as is customary or reason-
able. (Rose v. State, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 728.) It is more 
extensive than a mere opportunity to go into the street imme-
diately in front of one's property. (Racich v. Boarcl of Con-
trol, 23 Cal.2d 343 [144 P.2d 818] .) HmYevcr it do0s not 
rxtcnd beyond acceF>s to the next intersection at either end of: 
the street upon wllich the property abuts. v. City 
of 64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149 P.2d 2961.) incon-
veniences which may be suffered af:ter surh int0rsection is 
reaehcd do not impair the easement but are inconvenienc0s 
suffered him as a nwmber of the public." We were not 
concerned with whether the abutter had the r:rclusivc right 
to the public street abutting his property to the intersection. 
If I were to concur in the reasoning used by amicus curiae and 
the majority, I would be agreeing that the abutter had the 
exclusive right, even as against the municipality, to decide who 
would nsc the parking area in the public streets in front of 
his property to the intersection at either end thereof. It will 
51 C.2d-7 
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;dat(•d that Hw 
ahntier's did "nol nxteud tliP JIPXI 
irrtPn;eeiion :1t either l'lld of' 11H' sin'''l 1!JlOll wlii<-h tlw property 
almts.'' 
The majority agTers wiih the c:ontention of: thr Pc:oplc that 
a drterminatiou as to whethrr or not elosecl taxicabs stands 
are in the public int('rcst is a matter. Heliance is 
plaeed Oil the I'H:-it' of \'. (iulrn!', :!cj. CaL\pp.~cl Supp. 
770 [70 P.2d 724], wherc·in the same type of ordinance was 
held eonstitutional and that the equal proteeotion clause was 
not violated. In the Galena case, the city of San Francisco 
had granted an exelusive cab stand on a public street to Yellow 
Cab Company. 'rhc driver of a I~uxor Cab was arrested for 
standing his cab in that stand, and the appellate department 
of the superior court affirme1l the judgmrnt of conviction of 
violation of the ordinaner. ·while the Galena case involved 
approximately the same ordimmce as the one under considera-
tion, .it is, of course, not binding on this court. When the 
question arises in a proper case it is the province of the 
judicial department of this state to finally determine the 
constitutionality of the judgment of the legislative body. 'l'his 
court should not be concerned with the poliey of the legislative 
body, but with the constitutionality of the enactment. 
Petitioner also contends that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional in that it confers unlimited discretion upon the Chief 
of Police in both granting the permits for taxicab stands and 
the revocation of such permits. There is no standard set forth 
to guide the Chief of Police in granting the permit and any 
permit so geantrd may be revoked "at hi::; pleasure." "It is 
the function of the Legislature to declare a policy and fix the 
primary stan(!anl. 'fo promote the purposes o£ the legislation 
and carry it into effect, the authorized administrative or min-
isterial offic:er may 'fill up the details' by pre:,eribiug adminis-
trative rules and regulations (Ji'irst Industrial Loan Co. v. 
Daugherty, 26 Cal.2d 545, 549 [159 P.2d 921] ), but as so 
empowered, he may not 'vary or enlarge the terms or condi-
tions of [the] legislative 0nactment' (Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 
Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797]; also Whitcomb IIotcl, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 758, 7:'57 [151 P.2d 2:l3, 155 
A.L.R. 405]) or 'compel that to be done 1\·hich lies without 
the seope of the statute.' (Pirst I11dustrial Loan Co. v. 
Da1tghcrty, supra, p. 550.)" (Kmrdscn Creamery Co. v. 
Brock, 37 Cal.2d 485, 492, 4:l3 [234 P.2cl 26] .) .And "While 
the delegation of governmental authority to an administrative 
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body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolute 
legislative discretion is not. To avoid such a result it is neces-
sary that a delegating statute establish an ascertainable stand-
ard to guide the administrative body." (Stale Board of Dry 
Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lu.x Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal.2d 436, 448 
[254 P.2d 29].) Tn ]i'ranchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, 
36 Cal.2d 548 [ 225 P .2d 905], we said : "It is well 
established that a legislative body may delrgate to a hoard or 
officer the discretion of carrying out a declared policy accord-
ing to a fcs! or standard. It is not necessary that 
the IJ;'gislaturc ' ... find for itself every fact upon which it 
desires to basr lrgislativc action or that it make for itself 
detailed determinations whieh it has declared to be prerequi-
site to the application of the legislative policy to particular 
facts and circumstances. . . . These essentials are preserved 
when ... [the legislative body] has specified the ba:sie condi-
tions of fact upon IYhosc existence or Of'currenee, ascertained 
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, 
it directs that its si atntory command shall be effective.' 
(Yakus v. United 321 U.S. 414, 424-425 [64 S.Ct. 660, 
88 L.Ed. 834]; accord Bi-J1Ietalic Inv. Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 [36 S.Ct. 141, 60 I1.Ed. 372]; 
Field d': Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 [12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 
294].) " A reading of the ordinance involved shows that no 
basic conditiom or facts are set forth to guide the Chief of 
Police; that hi~ diseretion i.s absolutely undefined and unlim-
ited both as to granting and revoking the permits for taxicab 
stands. Tt has been held that the legislative body must declare 
thr policy of the law and fix some kind of legal principles 
which arc to control in given eases. It must provide an ade-
quate yardstick for the guidance of the executive or adminis-
trative body or officer empow0red to execute the law. (Blatz 
Brewing Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal.App.2d 639, 645 [160 P.2d 
371; Schaczlcin v. Cabrmiss, 135 Cal. 466 [67 P. 755, 87 Am. 
St. Rep. 122, 56 IJ.RA. 7331.) 
The ordinance involvrd herr constitntrs speeial Irgislation in 
violation of the Fonrtrenth Amendment to thr Constitution 
of the Unitrd Stat0s which provides that no state shall deny 
to any JH'rsoll within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the la\YS. The equal protec-tion elause applies to all depart-
ments of Ntate goyrrmnent (People v. Hines, 12 Cal.2cl 535 
[86 P.2d 921; Brock v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 605 [86 
P.2d 805]; .E.x parte Virgiuia, 100 U.S. 339 [25 IJ.Ed. 676); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 
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rick Wo Y. 
30 LEd. 220], 
an aclministration directed so 
and 
nnr"''"i''" as to amount to a practical denial by the State of 
of the laws which is seenred to the 
petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face 
and in appearance, yet, if it is applird and admin-
istered by public with an evil eye and an unequal 
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimi-
nations between persons in similar circumstances matrrial to 
their the dc-nial of equal justice is still w·ithin the 
prohibition of the Constitution.'' 
92 U.S. 275 [23 L.Ed. 550] ; 
100 U.S. 339 [25 L.Ed. 676]; Neal v. 
[26 L.Ed. .) 
Article I, section of the California Constitution provides 
that "No privileges or immunities shall ever be 
granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by 
the Legislature, nor shall any or class of citizens, be 
granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, 
shall not be granted to aU citizens." (Sec also art. IV, § 25, 
sn bd. 33; art. I, § This srction applies to and constitutes 
a restraint upon boards of supervisors of counties (In re Blois, 
179 CaL 291 [176 P. ; .Acton v. 150 Cal.App. 
2(1 1, 18 P.2d 481] ). It has also been eonstruPd to mean 
'' well '' (~Vat son v. 
Division P. 481] ; 
v. Barbont, 142 P.2d 187] ; City of 
Tulare v. Ihvn:n, 126 Cal. 226 .) It was the ohjcet 
of the framers of the Constitution to preveu t Yicious legisla-
tion for private ends which might be in an apparently 
;;)H .iJ:lO].) topart 
of a class is hrld to be and witl1in Hw i'Onstit ational 
(J[e Donal rl Y. Con , Dfl CaL 386 P 71 ; 
l'asad! na v. Stimsm1. 91 CaL 2:38 P. ; Lelandc 
:w Cal.2d 224 [T)7 P A.L.H. 1 
Sr:n·c Yoursdt" Oas. Stations 
124£1 P.2d ; Brock v 
P.2<1 
Tn ordel' to ayoid the fad thai tlJ<' lwte in ;pres· 
tion fixe's no standard to the administrative olfieer, the 
Parker v. Col!mrn. 19G CaL HHI P. 
921], \\·hid1 il1Yo1vcd a to rrt>et and maiuta a public 
garage in the of Oaldand. >nts held that because a 
garage· had a to inc·n'ase the fire it was with-
in tho power to a fol' the "onstnwtion 
tlJerr•ol'. 'l'he c·ase did not inYolYe th: of a permit 
for the eum;trudion of g:u·age like cireum-
stauee~, it ,,·as to anoth<•l', alld tlJo ordiuan<·e inYolyed 
and speeifit·a.l !y nwntionr,J three "<'lasses" of garages which 
were defined. A elass "C" g;lt'age \HlS not more thau "one 
story high and [vrhieh a c·ement floor" inyolved in 
the ease. A standard to gnide the admini:;t t·ati n' ofli(·er 1Yas 
thcrrforc set forth. Jn In 187 Cal. 640 [203 P. 
:mR], tbe should 
have powers ovet· in 
"se(·ond-hand mrrehml!lisn" among other rnunwrai;•d art ides. 
rl'he ('Olltc·ndef1 that a JWI',iOll in Sec·ond-hand 
hooks dirl not eOJl!e IYitJ:iu tlJr te>rms of the on1inanee. rl'he 
ordimuH'o one iu SU(:h seeoni1-hand mer-
ehandisr to obtain a permit for the sale thereof. 'l'lw ease did 
not iuvoln' the granting of a to one when it was denied 
to another. And the case stands for the 
that the term ''merchandise'' intludes ''books'' aud that the 
regulation of the sale of such second-hand books is a lawful 
exer(:ise of the police power Ex parte 85 CaL 
208 [24 P. 747], invohed the granting, or 
to sell It is not in inasmuc·h 
that if a governing power could prohibit altogether 
it could sueh conditiolls as it saw fit. 'l'his docs not 
mean that, under the same conditions, it eould prohibit the 
issuanee of a license to one in the same class while granting 
such a license to another of a like elass. In any event, the 
I X RE PETERSEX 0.2d 
ordiumwe there involyed provided fol' the alterna-
tive: That in trw event a majority of the board of police emu-
missioners refused to grant a permit for the issuance of such 
a license, the applicant could procure the conseu t of twelve 
eitizeus \Yho owned real estate in the area, and a liecuse was 
thereupon issued to him. Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 123 [13 P. 
310], involved an ordinance prohibiting the alteration, repair, 
or construction of any wooden buildi11g within certain pre-
S(';ribed fire limits without permission in writillg signed by a 
majority of the firewardeus and approved by a majority of 
the committee on fire department and the mayor. The court 
quoted from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 
30 hEd. 220], and noted, spccifieally, that the ordinance did 
not diserimiuate against persons within a certain dass but 
operated equally on all within the class. 'l'he ordinance 
singled out wooden buildings-not all buildings. In other 
words, ''wooden'' lmildings constituted the class. Other cases 
cited in the majority opinion fall within the r:;ame general 
elassification and are not in point here. The ordi11ance here 
involved operates unequally on all within a, class. 'I'here ir:; 
nothing to guide the chief of poliee in his designation of 
which company shall oceupy which taxicab stand. As I have 
heretofore noted, all taxicab companies must be licensed; all 
the drivers for such companies must be lieensed and arc re-
quired to pass au examination prior thereto. There is abso-
lutely no legal basis on which to favor one company over an-
other and yet it is very apparent that one member of the same 
class has been favored over all othcrc; of the same class. 
It is obvious that the ordinance docs not satisfy the re-
quirements set forth in the preeeding citations of authority 
and should, be held void for the additional reason 
that it eom;ti1utes au unconstitutional 
discretion to an administrative officer. 
ol' lPgislative 
Por the foregoing reasons I would discharge the prisoner. 
HeRpoudC'JJt 's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
~G, 1958. 
